My research interests lie in epistemology. I am interested in questions about our epistemic environment and how that impacts what we can know. In particular, how does our social environment affect our epistemic standing? In what way can we reasonably rely on others? Can we rely on others even if we are not aware of what they are doing?
My PhD thesis was entitled "Disagreement and the rationality of religious belief". I defended the view that it is sometimes reasonable to continue holding your beliefs even when you discover that others, who are your epistemic equals, disagree with you. I defended this against a number of objections and applied it to the issue of religious diversity. At Heythrop College I am working on the research project New Models of Religious Understanding. I am arguing that religious understanding is epistemically more valuable than religious knowledge. This conclusion has some interesting implications for sceptical arguments. |
Papers
Return of the Great Pumpkin
(2014) Religious Studies 50: 297-308
According to Alvin Plantinga there is no good reason to think that there is anything unacceptable about religious belief even if the believer cannot present evidence or arguments in support of her beliefs. One important challenge to this claim is the ‘Great Pumpkin’ objection. This objection is that Plantinga's arguments could be used to defend very strange beliefs such as belief in the Great Pumpkin. I describe this objection in more detail and then offer a solution to the problem by considering how the historical and social environment might provide favouring evidence for Christian beliefs.
A New Problem for Virtue Epistemology
(Under Review)
Virtue epistemology offers an account of knowledge in terms of cognitive abilities. In order to deal with counter examples virtue epistemologists argue that only certain environments are appropriate for exercising our cognitive abilities. In this paper I show that there is a problem in the way that virtue epistemologists identify appropriate environments and highlight this using a though experiment.
Proper function and epistemic twin earth
(Under Review)
An objection to virtue epistemology has been raised by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard that they call the epistemic twin earth objection. This objection can also be used against Alvin Plantinga’s proper functionalism. In this paper I show how this is possible. I then go on to demonstrate how proper functionalism can be amended in order to provide a response to the objection. My explaining in more detail what it means for our cognitive faculties to be well designed it is possible to show how an agent can have knowledge even when she might easily have been in an environment where she would have formed false beliefs.
The Problem of Arrogance
(Under Review)
There is a problem in the epistemology of disagreement that I will refer to as the problem of arrogance, and it is that if it is permissible to hold on to your beliefs in the face of disagreement then it seems that over a series of disagreement you will come to have evidence that the person that you are disagreeing with is your epistemic inferior. This seems like an absurd conclusion. This problem is similar to problems raised about epistemic circularity where it is alleged that one is able to reach absurd conclusion by employing epistemic processes on themselves. In this paper I seek to bring insights from the literature on epistemic circularity to bear on the problem of arrogance to see if any of those proposals can be used to offer a response. I conclude by showing that there is a proposal that can be adapted and used to solve this problem.
How not to identify favourable epistemic environments
(Under Review)
Alvin Plantinga has proposed an analysis of knowledge called proper functionalism. This view faces problems when it comes to some kinds of gettier cases. Plantinga an others have attempted to overcome this problem by adding an extra condition that identifies favourable mini-environments for exercising a cognitive faculty. In this paper I show that each of these proposals fails to deal with the problem. There is a solution, however, but it does not require adding to Plantinga’s account. Instead the problem can be solved by better describing the existing environmental requirement in proper functionalism.
Return of the Great Pumpkin
(2014) Religious Studies 50: 297-308
According to Alvin Plantinga there is no good reason to think that there is anything unacceptable about religious belief even if the believer cannot present evidence or arguments in support of her beliefs. One important challenge to this claim is the ‘Great Pumpkin’ objection. This objection is that Plantinga's arguments could be used to defend very strange beliefs such as belief in the Great Pumpkin. I describe this objection in more detail and then offer a solution to the problem by considering how the historical and social environment might provide favouring evidence for Christian beliefs.
A New Problem for Virtue Epistemology
(Under Review)
Virtue epistemology offers an account of knowledge in terms of cognitive abilities. In order to deal with counter examples virtue epistemologists argue that only certain environments are appropriate for exercising our cognitive abilities. In this paper I show that there is a problem in the way that virtue epistemologists identify appropriate environments and highlight this using a though experiment.
Proper function and epistemic twin earth
(Under Review)
An objection to virtue epistemology has been raised by Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard that they call the epistemic twin earth objection. This objection can also be used against Alvin Plantinga’s proper functionalism. In this paper I show how this is possible. I then go on to demonstrate how proper functionalism can be amended in order to provide a response to the objection. My explaining in more detail what it means for our cognitive faculties to be well designed it is possible to show how an agent can have knowledge even when she might easily have been in an environment where she would have formed false beliefs.
The Problem of Arrogance
(Under Review)
There is a problem in the epistemology of disagreement that I will refer to as the problem of arrogance, and it is that if it is permissible to hold on to your beliefs in the face of disagreement then it seems that over a series of disagreement you will come to have evidence that the person that you are disagreeing with is your epistemic inferior. This seems like an absurd conclusion. This problem is similar to problems raised about epistemic circularity where it is alleged that one is able to reach absurd conclusion by employing epistemic processes on themselves. In this paper I seek to bring insights from the literature on epistemic circularity to bear on the problem of arrogance to see if any of those proposals can be used to offer a response. I conclude by showing that there is a proposal that can be adapted and used to solve this problem.
How not to identify favourable epistemic environments
(Under Review)
Alvin Plantinga has proposed an analysis of knowledge called proper functionalism. This view faces problems when it comes to some kinds of gettier cases. Plantinga an others have attempted to overcome this problem by adding an extra condition that identifies favourable mini-environments for exercising a cognitive faculty. In this paper I show that each of these proposals fails to deal with the problem. There is a solution, however, but it does not require adding to Plantinga’s account. Instead the problem can be solved by better describing the existing environmental requirement in proper functionalism.